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Abstract
The attention that deep learning has garnered from the academic community and
industry continues to grow year over year, and it has been said that we are in a
new golden age of artificial intelligence research. However, neural networks are still
often seen as a “black box” where learning occurs but cannot be understood in a
human-interpretable way. Since these machine learning systems are increasingly being
adopted in security contexts, it is important to explore these interpretations. We
consider an Android malware traffic dataset for approaching this problem. Then, using
the information plane, we explore how homeomorphism affects learned representation
of the data and the invariance of the mutual information captured by the parameters
on that data. We empirically validate these results, using accuracy as a second measure
of similarity of learned representations.
Our results suggest that although the details of learned representations and the
specific coordinate system defined over the manifold of all parameters differ slightly,
the functional approximations are the same. Furthermore, our results show that since
mutual information remains invariant under homeomorphism, only feature engineering
methods that alter the entropy of the dataset will change the outcome of the neural
network. This means that for some datasets and tasks, neural networks require
meaningful, human-driven feature engineering or changes in architecture to provide
enough information for the neural network to generate a sufficient statistic. Applying
our results can serve to guide analysis methods for machine learning engineers and
suggests that neural networks that can exploit the convolution theorem are equally
ii
accurate as standard convolutional neural networks, and can be more computationally
efficient.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Malicious software (malware), has long been a burden on users of computers and the
internet. For individuals, a malware attack can cause the loss of their personal data
and may allow hackers to access their bank accounts, steal their identity, or hold all of
the files on their computer ransom. For a business, the effects can be extremely dire,
with the average cost of a malware attack sitting around $1.7 million [2]. This problem
is continuing to grow, and malware authors innovate in an effort to circumvent existing
mitigating controls. As the IRA said to Margaret Thatcher after the Brighton Hotel
Bombing: “We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always” [3]. So too
is the case for malware, which must only find one vulnerable system to cause immense
damage, while defenders must be lucky on all of their systems. As such, traditional
signature-based antivirus engines have become less effective against unseen strains
of malware [4], and so machine learning techniques have helped provide detection of
these threats on the endpoint.
In the case of mobile malware, we often do not have the luxury of running
computationally intensive processes on an endpoint, nor do we have the ability to
remove malware from devices that we do not own that are brought onto our networks.
As such, we need to leverage this same machine learning technology to perform
endpoint-agnostic network detection of malware threats. In these cases, a network-
based solution seems ideal, as this allows us to mitigate vectors commonly used by
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modern worms [5]. Traditional intrusion detection systems like Snort will continue to
mitigate known threats, but these signature-based systems suffer from the same curse
of reactivity as the traditional antivirus. In order to mitigate these threats, mitigating
controls must be learned on the fly instead of reactively post-hoc by a human analyst.
Machine learning is a form of statistical learning that emphasizes predictions and
pattern recognition in data [6]. Generally, machine learning is viewed as a subset of
artificial intelligence where algorithms build mathematical models based on sample
data in order to make predictions without being programmed to do so [7]. Machine
learning is broadly divided into 3 categories: Supervised learning, where a function
to map data to a set of associated labels is learned; Unsupervised learning, where
groupings or clusters of the data are identified without labels; and Reinforcement
learning, which is concerned with experiential learning through agent interactions
with an environment. Though there are more granular categories, these suffice for
most purposes. In our case, we are concerned with a classification task for data where
we do have labels - so we concern ourselves with supervised learning throughout this
work.
1.1 Neural Networks
Neural Networks are a type of connectionist machine learning system in which artificial
neurons are connected to one another in an attempt to emulate biological cognitive
functions. Each neuron is a node that connects to others in a way that mimics the
dendrite-synapse-axon connections, illustrated in Figure 1-1. Each of these connections,
similar to the myelin sheath in the brain, has a weight that determines the strength
of any node on another.
Deep learning [8] is a particular form of machine learning in which artificial neurons
are stacked on top of one another in two or more layers. Having a larger number of
2
Figure 1-1. Neuron and mylinated axon with signal flow by Egm4313.s12 (Prof. Loc
Vu-Quoc) - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.
php?curid=72816083
layers allows the network to learn increasingly complex representations at the cost of
training speed and the need for more data. This has reasonably led us to ask what the
applicability of neural networks and deep learning are to domains other than natural
language processing [9] and computer vision [10].
Neural networks are not new and are quite closely related to the work of Gauss and
Legendre [11] on polynomial regression. This linear approximator takes the weights
of the neuron wi and multiplies them by the input xi and compares them with a
threshold (or bias, as we will refer to it), b. So for our linear approximator, L, we
have: L(x) = ∑ni=1wixi − b. In order to determine whether or not this neuron “fires”,
we use a nonlinear activation function such as the Heaviside function, the sigmoid
function, or the rectified linear unit (ReLU), which we denote σ. First, define the
Heaviside function, which we denote δ(x) 1:
δ(x) =
⎧⎨⎩0 if x < 01 if x ≥ 0 (1.1)
We define the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) by σ : R→ R:
σ(z) = zδ(z) = max{0, z} (1.2)
1The Heaviside function is typically denoted H(x) but we reserve that notation for entropy, which
we define in Chapter 2
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and so the output of our neuron is given by:
yˆ = σ
(
n∑
i=0
wixi
)
(1.3)
where w0 = b and x0 = −1 to account for the bias term.
The weights are initialized randomly when the network is instantiated and are
updated during the training process. In order to update the weights, a loss function
must be specified. This loss function will take the output of the neural network yˆ and
compare this prediction with the true value y to assess the error. Loss functions are too
numerous to go through in detail here, so we refer interested readers to Goodfellow [8]
for details. For our purposes, we are interested in a classification task, and so we use
the cross-entropy loss, defined as:
J = −
M∑
c=1
yo,c ln(yˆo,c) (1.4)
Where
yo,c =
⎧⎨⎩1 if class label c is correct for observation o0 otherwise
and yˆo,c is the predicted probability that observation o belongs to class c. Since our
number of classes, M equals 2, the cross-entropy loss simplifies to:
J = −[y ln(yˆ) + (1− y) ln(1− yˆ)] (1.5)
In order to update our weights, we must take the gradient of the loss function, ∇J ,
and then update the weights of each layer by backpropogation:
wt = wt−1 − α ∗ ∇Jt−1 (1.6)
where α is the learning rate. There are many optimization algorithms which can be
used by neural networks, and this is an active area of research. Throughout our text,
we use stochastic gradient descent [12] without momentum.
Much of the power of neural networks as compared to standard polynomial re-
gression stems from their incredible ability to generalize to previously unseen data.
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Cybenko [13] first proved that 2-layer neural networks using sigmoid activation func-
tions can uniformly approximate any continuous function of n real variables with
support in the unit hypercube. This result has been extended several times to other
activation functions and networks of bounded width and depth. Due to Lu et al. [14],
we can state the following:
Theorem 1.1.1. Let f : Rn → R be a Lebesgue-measurable function satisfying
∫
Rn
⏐⏐f(x)⏐⏐ dx <∞
then for any Lebesgue-integrable function f and ϵ ∈ R; ϵ > 0, there exists a fully-
connected ReLU network A of width dm ≤ 4+ n such that the function FA represented
by the neural network satisfies:
∫
Rn
⏐⏐f(x)− FA(x)⏐⏐ dx < ϵ
Despite the strength of these results, representation learning and neural network
interpretability are open questions. At present, little is understood about the exact
mechanism by which neural networks are able to learn, and what the meaning of
the learned representation is. Some theories exist and since many of them are not
mutually exclusive, it stands to reason that several may be true. In particular, we will
consider the information bottleneck theory [15, 16] from a geometric point of view.
1.2 Prior Work
Our work leverages an expanded dataset from Watkins et al. [17] and one of our
objectives, as in Watkins’ work, is to build a model that sufficiently detects Android
malware using the interarrival time of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping
packets. In the literature, decision trees were used to classify traffic. Other work on
the dataset by Watkins’ team more closely mirrors our own, and details are elaborated
in Chapter 3. In order to compare to Watkins’ results to our own neural network
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results, we leverage a random forest from the Scikit-learn [18] Python package to
serve as a baseline. Our work differs in that rather than just seeking to optimize
our capability to detect malware, we use Watkins’ dataset to evaluate the efficacy of
different neural network architectures.
The use of Fourier transforms in neural networks has been of interest for some time,
and there are several papers on the subject [19–21] which consider these applications.
The choice to explore Fourier transforms in convolutional neural networks is natural,
as the dot product is much faster than a convolution operation that relies on a
sliding kernel. We lean most heavily on the paper by Pratt et al. [20] due to its
recency and implementation details. Particularly, Pratt considers the impact of the
convolution theorem within neural networks and uses the Fast Fourier Transform to
quickly compute F(κ ∗ u) = F(κ)⊙F(u), where F is the Fast Fourier Transform, ∗
denotes convolution, and ⊙ denotes the Hadamard pointwise Product. Ultimately, the
paper shows that on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets, the overall accuracy is lower
than benchmark results - though the network trains and evaluates images much more
quickly. Interestingly, we found the opposite results, which we detail in Chapter 3.
Wavelet neural networks pioneered by Fujieda et al. [22] have shown promise for
generalized convolution by abstracting them into downsampling and filtering in the
spectral domain. The results in the Fujieda paper were significant, as the network
achieved better accuracy results than AlexNet on the target dataset while having
approximately 1/4 the number of parameters. In addition, the memory requirements
and speed of the network were a significant improvement on the other architectures
considered by Fujieda. It is worth noting that implementation details from Fujieda
are sparse, and so our implementation may differ from this reference implementation
in some way, though the spirit and overall methods are the same.
Our work also considers and builds upon the Information Bottleneck theory of
Neural Networks introduced by Tishby [15]. The information bottleneck theory of
6
deep learning suggests that the goal of supervised learning is to capture and efficiently
represent the relevant information about the input data about the target data. In the
process of creating a minimal sufficient statistic, a maximally compressed mapping
of the input which minimizes mutual information is generated. Tishby does this
by demonstrating that the layered structure of the network creates a Markov chain
of intermediate representations that forms the sufficient statistics. The paper also
suggests learning via information bottleneck, a technique we do not leverage.
Many of the issues with the information bottleneck theory are addressed in a
controversial paper by Saxe [1]. Saxe argues compellingly that many of the issues
with the saturation of nonlinearities such as tanh are not observed with ReLU.
Additionally, it argues - using empirical results - that networks which do not compress
can still generalize. Saxe does not, however, argue that the fundamental conceit of the
information bottleneck theory still holds and that an information theoretic approach
to neural networks is still critical.
Fischer [16] improves on Tishby’s work by addressing Saxe’s concerns and exper-
imenting with both deterministic models as well as Variational Information Bottle-
neck [23] models. Fischer suggests that problems with robust generalization and lack of
compression stem from models retaining too much information about the training data.
The Conditional Entropy Bottleneck model proposed by Fischer directly optimizes
what he calls the Minimum Necessary Information criteria. Our work leans on the
minimum necessary information criterion as a point of theory, and we detail it in
Chapter 2.
1.3 Content of this Thesis
Neural networks largely remain a closed box and in practice, a lot of effort needs to be
invested into feature engineering to achieve desired outcomes. This is not necessarily
7
true in the computer vision space where representations are learned from pixels, but
is demonstrably true in domains such as information security, where terminology is
not universally agreed upon and measurement can be difficult. Additionally, feature
engineering is crucial in systems where the relationship between measurements and
events is not deterministic and easily confounded.
Wavelet transforms and the Fourier transform were considered for use as powerful
tools from signal processing that have wide-ranging uses and implications well beyond
our goal of malware classification. Our initial expectation was that these tools would
serve to enhance the ability of networks to learn by extracting features from the raw
data, processing it into a form which would give the neural network a more robust
feature set to learn from. During the experiments, the transformations seemed not to
alter the ability of the network to learn, and we looked to information theory for an
explanation. In our consideration of the network as a manifold and the weights of
the network as projections of our data as a coordinate system on that manifold which
is optimized through gradient descent, information theory provided a framework on
which to build understanding of our results. This work is presented in the following
order, which front-loads this theory as a lens through which we can see our results.
• In Chapter 2, we cover the necessary information theory to contextualize the
results of this thesis. We cover common terminology, all of which is covered
in greater depth in the canonical introduction to information theory by Cover
and Thomas [24]. We move on to prove an important result about preservation
of mutual information under homeomorphism. We introduce the information
bottleneck and the concept of minimum necessary information, which further
contextualizes our results. We then discuss a geometric view of neural networks
and how the optimal weights of the neural network can be viewed as the
orthonormal projection of the target onto the manifold of the neural network.
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• In Chapter 3, we address our malware problem and dataset. We explain the
four neural network architectures, and two baseline models we use in our ex-
periments. We conduct transforms on our data and treat the raw, Fourier, and
Wavelet-transformed data as well as a dataset of summary statistics in line with
Watkins [17]. We also run our malware dataset through Fourier and Wavelet
neural networks inspired by prior work [20, 22] where the convolution theorem
is exploited to learn representations. We consider the mutual information as
before and address the accuracy results of the networks in question on our raw
and summary datasets. We also capture the information plane representation of
mutual information in the network similar to prior research [1, 25].
• In Chapter 4, we treat the MNIST dataset as our baseline for performance.
This experiment was conducted to confirm our findings from our experiments
on the malware dataset. We choose MNIST as our baseline dataset; due to the
vast amount of literature on MNIST, it has been referred to as the "Drosophila
of machine learning" [8], making it suitable to contextualize our results. Our
experimentation in this chapter is functionally the same as in Chapter 3, with
minor modifications to the methodology where they would not apply to an
image-based dataset, such as the elimination of the summary statistic dataset
and the baseline detection models.
• Finally, Chapter 5 brings together the outcomes of our networks, baseline models,
and information theoretic considerations of learning to explain our results. We
consider avenues for further research and potential implications of our findings.
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Chapter 2
Information Theory Preliminaries
2.1 A Whirlwind Tour of Information Theory
Since our work makes use of information theory, it is helpful to cover the core
terminology. For the following proofs, all random variables are assumed to be discrete.
This is both because binary computers have only finite precision, which means they
are not “truly” continuous, and discrete information theory is a more mature science
in that many foundational results are proven only in the discrete case.
First, we define entropy as the measure of uncertainty of a single random variable.
Let X be a random variable with alphabet X and probability mass function p(x) =
Pr{X = x}, x ∈ X . Then the entropy of X, represented H(X) is defined as
H(X) = −∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) (2.1)
Here our logarithm is to the base 2, as information is most commonly represented as
bits. We maintain this definition of the logarithm throughout.
In the case where we are examining two random variables, for example, a dataset
and its labels, we may want to consider the joint and conditional entropy of those
random variables. The joint density of a pair of discrete random variables (X, Y ) with
joint distribution p(X, Y ) is:
H(X, Y ) = −∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(x, y) (2.2)
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and the differential entropy H(Y |X) as:
H(Y |X) = −∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(y|x) (2.3)
Therefore, we define mutual information, I(X;Y ) as the relative entropy between
the joint distribution and the product distribution:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x, y)
p(x)p(y) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) (2.4)
Mutual information is an important quantity for us, since it is a measure of dependence
between two random variables. Specifically, it provides a measure of information
obtained about one random variable by the observation of another random variable.
Therefore, if we can observe X and want to predict Y , we would like for the mutual
information between X and Y to be high.
We define the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(p||q) between two probability mass
functions p(x) and q(x) to be:
D(p||q) = ∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
q(x) (2.5)
Lastly, we introduce the data processing inequality. Assume that three random
variables X, Y, and Z form a Markov chain denoted X → Y → Z. Let Z depend
only on Y and let Z be conditionally independent of X. Then the data processing
inequality shows that no local manipulation of the data can improve inferences drawn
from that data. By the chain rule, we can expand mutual information as follows:
I(X;Y, Z) = I(X;Z) + I(X;Y |Z) (2.6)
= I(X;Y ) + I(X;Z|Y ) (2.7)
Since X and Z are conditionally independent given Y , we have I(X;Z|Y ) = 0. Since
I(X;Y |Z) ≥ 0, we have:
I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Z) (2.8)
which is known as the data processing inequality.
Detailed derivation of all above results are available in [24].
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2.2 Invariance of Mutual Information
We begin by proving the invariance of mutual information under homeomorphism,
based on a similar proof [26].
Theorem 2.2.1 (Invariance of Mutual Information under Homeomorphism). Take
two random variables X and Y where Y is the set of labels of X. Let X ′ = ψ(X),
where ψ is a smooth and uniquely invertible map (a homeomorphism). Then since
X is a random variable, X ′ is a random variable as long as ψ is well-defined for the
range of X. Thus, I(X ′;Y ) = I(X;Y ).
Proof. Given the Jacobi determinant JX = ||∂X/∂X ′|| = ||∂X/∂ψ(X)||, we observe
that the joint distribution of X ′ and Y is given by: fX′,Y (x′, y) = JX(x′)f(x, y)
I(X ′;Y ) =
∫ ∫
dx′dyf(x′, y) log f(x
′, y)
fx′(x′)fy(y′)
(2.9)
=
∫ ∫
dxdyf(x, y) log f(x, y)
fx(x)fy(y)
(2.10)
= I(X;Y ) (2.11)
2.3 Minimum Necessary Information and Informa-
tion Bottleneck
Naftali Tishby and Noga Zaslavsky introduced the information bottleneck theory of
neural networks [15] as a way of explaining the theoretical generalization bounds of
neural networks. In particular, Tishby and Zaslavsky show that any deep neural
network can be quantified by the mutual information between the input, hidden layers,
and the output variable by way of information per the data processing inequality,
Equation 2.8. Neural networks satisfy the information bottleneck optimality equation:
min
p(z|x):Y→X→Z
|I(Z;X)− βI(Z;Y )|, β > 0 (2.12)
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Where Y are the true labels, X is the observed data about Y , and Z is the learned
representation. The information bottleneck learns the representation Z subject to
the above constraint, where β controls the strength of the constraint. The standard
cross-entropy loss is recovered as β → ∞. We do not concern ourselves with the
existence of the compression phase addressed by Saxe [1] but instead observe that
the information bottleneck optimality equation holds irrespective of whether fitting
and compression happen in sequence or simultaneously. Additionally, the value of the
information bottleneck to this work is in its implication that a neural network seeks
to learn a representation, Z, which retains a maximal amount of information about
Y and a minmal amount of information about X. Further work by Alemi et al. [23]
suggests refinements on the information bottleneck theory that we do not discuss in
detail here.
The Minimum Necessary Information as defined by Fischer [16] consists of three
components for a learned representation:
1. InformationWe would like a representation Z that captures useful information
about a dataset (X, Y ).
2. Necessity The value of information to accomplish a task. In this case, predicting
Y given X using our representation Z. That is, I(X;Y ) ≤ I(Y ;Z)
3. Minimality Given all representations that can solve the task, we prefer the one
that retains the smallest amount of mutual information. That is, I(X;Y ) ≥
I(X;Z).
As mentioned in our discussion of Equation 2.4, the higher the mutual information
between this representation Z and our desired prediction Y , the better our predictions
will be.
Using Fischer’s definitions of necessity and minimality, we see that there is a point
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called the “MNI Point”:
I(X;Y ) = I(X;Z) = I(Y ;Z) (2.13)
This equation may not be satisfiable, since for any representation Z given a dataset
(X, Y ), there is a maximum value we are subject to:
1 ≥ D(X||Z) = sup
Z←X→Y
I(Y ;Z)
I(X;Z) (2.14)
Where D(X||Z) is the KL divergence given in Equation 2.5 and we achieve equality if
and only if the Markov chain X → Y is deterministic.
2.4 Information Geometry of Neural Networks
A neural network, as mentioned briefly in Section 1.1, is a form of connectionist
machine learning that is a universal approximator under minor assumptions about
the activation function [8]. In particular, a neural network connects many artificial
neurons each of which receive input x and emit an output that is a prediction of y.
From Equation 1.3, the forward pass of a single neuron gives us:
yˆ = σ
(
n∑
i=1
wixi + βi
)
= σ(wx+ β) (2.15)
Where σ is an activation function meeting the aforementioned assumptions, and β is
a bias vector.
Let S be the manifold of neural network outputs S = {σ(wx+β) : w ∈ Rn, β ∈ R}
parametrized by w and β. We picture the manifold S as an (n+1)-dimensional smooth
surface in the infinite-dimensional space of functions on Rn. Assume that our data is
generated by some function g such that y = g(x). Then if g ∈ S there exist w∗ ∈ Rn,
β∗ ∈ R such that we have an exact representation of g. In general, most target
functions are not in S and so we must train the values
(w∗, β∗) = argmin
w,b
dist(g,S) (2.16)
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which correspond to the coordinates of the orthogonal projection of g onto the surface
S. Thus, our optimal parameter ξ∗ = (w∗, β∗), if it exists, is given by:
ξ∗ = argmin
w,β
dist(p(x, z), p(x, y;w, β)) (2.17)
= argmin
ξ
D(p(x, z)||p(x, y; ξ)) (2.18)
where D is the KL divergence specified in Equation 2.5. The relationship between
the joint probability distribution and mutual information is specified in Equation 2.4.
Since we optimize ξ with respect to D(yˆ||y), as we approach the MNI point, the KL
divergence approaches zero.
Returning to our derivation in Theorem 2.2.1, we see that the optimal parameter
ξ∗ and the MNI point given by Equation 2.14 can be achieved for X ′ = ϕ(X), where
ϕ is a homeomorphism, since any projection onto S will still be on the manifold,
translated by the map ϕ. Thus, we conjecture that the ability of a network to learn
a representation that is predictive of y is invariant to homeomorphism on the input
data manifold. Returning to Equation 2.14, when Z is replaced by yˆ, we find that
as we approach the global minimum of the loss surface, we are minimizing D(yˆ||y),
which allows us to show:
minD(yˆ||y) = min sup
Yˆ←X→Y
I(Y ; Yˆ )
I(X; Yˆ )
(2.19)
= min sup
f(X,ξ)←X→Y
I(Y ; f(X, ξ))
I(X; f(X, ξ)) (2.20)
= min sup
fX(ξ)←X→Y
I(Y ; fX(ξ))
I(X; fX(ξ))
(2.21)
where fX(ξ) is the neural network with inputX and given parameters ξ. So our learning
process is minimizing the mutual information between Y and ξ, while maximizing the
mutual information between X and ξ. This inequality also holds for ξ′, the optimal
set of parameters for the input X ′. This theory is discussed in the context of our
experiments in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1 - Watkins Malware
Dataset
Neural networks have demonstrated some success in the security domain [27] and so
we have applied them to the Watkins [17] dataset. This dataset consists of interarrival
times for packets sent to Android devices, some of which were running malware.
Detecting malware via network traffic is an important problem, and this interpretation
of the problem is crucial for addressing the situation where a network owner cannot
install an antivirus agent on a device that may be infected with malware. This is a
common situation when personal devices are introduced to a corporate network; being
able to detect malicious software on a device without having an agent on the device
provides a tremendous benefit to network defenders.
3.1 Methodology
This experiment proceeds in three parts. The first considers our standard models:
fully-connected neural network, convolutional neural network, support vector machine,
and random forest. These models process our malware datasets in alignment with the
methods elaborated in Section 3.2. In experiment 1.a, the neural networks are trained
for a maximum of 30 epochs and we use the early stopping technique to prevent
overfitting. Early stopping will end training early when some condition is met - in our
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case, we stop early if the network’s loss has not decreased by 0.001 or more for two
consecutive training epochs.
In experiment 1.b, we consider only the raw data across the standard models as
well as the Fourier neural network and wavelet neural network. The Fourier neural
network and wavelet neural network differ from a conventional convolutional neural
network by performing an in-layer transformation before the activation function is
applied, exploiting the convolution theorem. As in our previous experiment, in order
to ensure that deviations in the dataset did not induce significant variation in accuracy,
100 trials were run, and the accuracy and mean step time for all trials was averaged.
In experiment 1.c, the network is trained for 1000 epochs without early stopping,
and at each training epoch, the mutual information between the labels and the network,
I(Y ;M) and the mutual information between the data and the network, I(X;M) is
computed. This differs from the previous experiment as we do not concern ourselves
with accuracy but instead wish to see and plot the change in mutual information
during training. By running for 1000 epochs, we significantly overfit the training set,
making this a poor approach for optimizing accuracy. The details of this plot are
described below in Section 3.4.3
3.1.1 Mutual Information Computation
In each experiment, the following data are collected for each epoch:
1. The L2 norm of the weights
2. The mean of the gradients
3. The standard deviation of the gradients
4. The post-activation output of each layer for the test set.
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These data are then stored in a file. After training, the data is loaded from the files.
The entropy of the activity is computed by considering the KL-based upper bound on
the entropy using techniques from Section 4 of Kolchinsky and Tracey [28] to yield
the entropy of the layer H(M). This estimate is:
H(M) = −∑
i
pi ln
∑
j
pj exp(−D(mi||mj)) (3.1)
where p is either the probability density of the dataset, X, or the probability of the
label Y , and m is the probability density estimate of our network layer, M . For
the entropy with respect to the labels, individual label probabilities are computed
and used with the entropy of the activity to compute the conditional entropy of the
activity given the label probabilities, giving us H(M |Y ). This is used in conjunction
with our computation of H(M) so that we can compute the mutual information
I(Y ;M) = H(M)−H(M |Y ).
These two mutual information values are then used to display information plane
data as plotted in Figure 3-2, Figure 4-1 and others. These calculations are identical
to the methods used in Saxe [1].
3.2 Data
We leveraged four different datasets: Raw, Fourier-transformed, Wavelet-transformed,
and a dataset consisting of summary statistics. The summary statistics of the first
three are captured in Table 3-I - we did not compute summary statistics for the
dataset of summary statistics. Our data consisted of 98 legitimate applications and
120 pieces of malware, which were collected by Yu and Li [29]. This gives us a dataset
that is approximately 55% malware and 45% benignware. While this distribution is
not reflective of real environments where malware is significantly rarer than benign
applications, we do not adjust for this disparity since our tolerance for alerting on
benign applications is much higher than our tolerance for not detecting malicious
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applications. For each application, five trials were conducted where the interarrival
time was collected for each of 100 ICMP ping packets, yielding a total dataset of 1090
trials. Further details of the data collection can be found in [17, 29]. One interesting
effect of performing the transforms on the dataset is that while the continuous wavelet
transform reduces our variance significantly and slightly normalizes the dataset, the
Fourier transform has the opposite effect, introducing tremendous amounts of noise
into the dataset.
3.2.1 Raw data
This is the data as described above, captured by Yu and Li in accordance with
Watkins [17]. In this dataset, only the raw measurements are used in a 100-dimensional
row vector, with a label of 0 for benign and 1 for malicious.
3.2.2 Fourier data
The Fourier data is a copy of the raw data under the Fourier transform. In particular,
since our raw data is given by a single 100-dimensional row vector, it is a direct
mapping of that row vector under the Fast Fourier Transform as provided by the
numpy library.
3.2.3 Wavelet data
The wavelet dataset is a copy of the raw data under a continuous wavelet transform.
The Morlet wavelet is used for the transform for several reasons: First, it is a wavelet
that allows us to maintain the dimensionality of our data, making it easier to compare
in performance and to re-use neural network architectures. Secondly, the Morlet
wavelet is closely related to human perception [30, 31], providing a small connection to
the human brain conception of neural networks. Lastly, the Morlet wavelet is uniquely
invertible, which is not the case for all potential mother wavelets.
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3.2.4 Summary data
The summary data leverages the seven features used by Yu and Li: arithmetic mean,
standard deviation, variance, maximum, minimum, geometric mean, and harmonic
mean. These features were fed to the classifier based on the sample they were captured
from as a 7-dimensional row vector.
Dataset Name Mean Median Mean Var. Median Var.
Raw 27.43 10.07 8329.96 7663.89
Fourier 58.60* -1.45 12229005.34 7418186.12
Wavelet 1.30 -.072 1887.5 1507.16
Table 3-I. Dataset Summary Statistics
The small but non-zero imaginary part in the Fourier data required implementation
of methods from Trabelsi et al. [32] to achieve acceptable results.
3.3 Models
In our experiments, we leveraged the following models:
• Fully Connected Neural Network
• Convolutional Neural Network
• Fourier Neural Network
• Wavelet Neural Network
• Random Forest
• Support Vector Classifier
The summary statistic dataset was not used with the convolutional neural network,
nor was it used with the Fourier or wavelet neural networks because there is no spatial
*There is an extremely small, but non-zero imaginary part, on the order of 10−19i
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relationship between the data and so convolution offers no benefit. Additionally, only
the raw data was processed by the Fourier and Wavelet neural networks. Though
these networks are capable of processing the transformed data, there is no obvious
benefit to transforming already-transformed data in-network.
All code1 was written in Python, using the Tensorflow 2, PyTorch, and Scikit-learn
libraries. Only the baseline models - the random forest and support vector machine -
described in 3.3.5 used the Scikit-learn library, and only the Wavelet Convolutional
network described in 3.3.4 used PyTorch. The remaining models all used the Tensorflow
framework. In the case of our non-standard neural networks, we consider the work
of Pratt [20] and Fujieda [22]. Both the Fourier and Wavelet neural networks take
advantage of the convolution theorem - that is, given two functions f and g,
(f ∗ g)(t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(τ)g(t− τ)dt
=
∫
Rn
f(x)e−2πixνdx ·
∫
Rn
g(x)e−2πixνdx
= F{f}(ν) · F{g}(ν)
and in the inverse, we get:
f · g = F−1{F{f} ∗ F{g}}
This allows us to avoid the high computational cost of performing a convolution
via the sliding-tile method and instead potentially take advantage of the convolution
theorem to perform convolution at the speed of the dot product. We further elaborate
on the architecture below.
For our neural networks, we use the Tensorflow standard stochastic gradient descent
optimizer, with a learning rate of 0.001. Results with other optimizers have been
promising, and Adam [33] has been the optimizer of choice for many deep learning
applications in the past few years, though we do not leverage it here. Hardware
specifications on which these experiments ran is in Appendix I.
1Code is available at the following url: https://github.com/erickgalinkin/jhu_masters
21
3.3.1 Fully-Connected Neural Network
The fully-connected neural network architecture is a basic multi-layer perceptron
that accepts a 100-dimensional row vector. This vector is then fed to three densely
connected hidden layers, each with 256 ReLU-activated neurons. The fourth and
final output neuron is a single sigmoid-activated layer, which provides a probability of
maliciousness.
3.3.2 Standard Convolutional Neural Network
Our convolutional neural network is a sequential model that accepts a 100-dimensional
row vector as input. This input is processed by two convolutional layers, both with
256 neurons. The first has a kernel size of 5 and a stride size of 1, and the second
has a kernel size of 3 with a stride of size 1. The output of the second convolutional
layer is processed by two densely connected layers of 128 neurons each. The final layer
consists of a sigmoid-activated output layer, the same as the fully-connected neural
network.
3.3.3 Fourier Convolutional Neural Network
Our Fourier “Convolutional” neural network is identical architecturally to our standard
convolutional neural network, only with the convolutional layers replaced by Fourier
layers. Here, we put the word convolutional in quotes due to the fact that no actual
convolution is performed. To be more intellectually honest, we should refer to this
network instead as a “Fourier Transform Cross Product Network”, though this may
confuse readers unfamiliar with the relationship. In the interest of broad understanding,
the term convolutional neural network is used when it helps clarify meaning even in
spite of being a slight misnomer.
Specifically, the Fourier Convolutional Neural Network leverages a custom Fourier
layer that moves the data into Fourier space via the Fast Fourier Transform and then
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multiplies the transpose of the weight matrix with the input to the matrix. Specifically,
given an input X(n) where the superscript is not an exponent, but instead indicates
the layer of the input, the Fourier layer ℓ acts on X to give an input to our next layer:
X(n+1) = ℓ(n)(X(n)) = σ(F−1(F(X(n)) ·W(n)⊤)) (3.2)
Where F is the Fast Fourier Transform, σ is the activation function - ReLU in this
case - andW is the weight matrix for layer n.
3.3.4 Wavelet Convolutional Neural Network
The Wavelet Convolutional Neural Network implements similar functionality to our
Fourier Neural Network, using the Discrete Wavelet Transform in lieu of the Fourier
transform. Due to the fact that there is a time component and a frequency component,
the wavelet neural network has a different in-layer dimensionality than our other
models but is otherwise identical.
In our Wavelet Convolutional Neural Network, we take a 100-dimensional row
vector as input. This input is then sent to the “wavelet layer” where it undergoes a
Daubechies discrete wavelet transform. There are a very large number of wavelets
which can be used in the discrete wavelet transform [30], but the Daubechies wavelet
is easy to put into practice and has a unique inverse everywhere, so we use it here.
The output is cast to a tensor that is multiplied against the transpose of the weight
tensor. This output then undergoes an inverse discrete wavelet transform with respect
to the same mother wavelet.
3.3.5 Baseline Models
Two baseline models were considered on these datasets. The first is the random forest
model provided in the Scikit-learn library with no hyperparameter tuning. Decision
tree models are generally good at classification tasks [12] but are weak classifiers that
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are sensitive to variance. Random forests are the result of averaging a large collection
of de-correlated trees and provide a good benchmark as a naïve model - in the respect
that it is untuned - for classification. Random forests are also performant in the
respect that they train and evaluate examples quickly, relative to neural networks.
This makes them common for use in industry.
The other benchmark model is a Support Vector Classifier, again provided by
the Scikit-learn library. The rationale for using a Support Vector Machine is that
we wanted to see if some hyperplane could be learned that would separate the data.
This model was again, naïve in the respect that it was merely the “out of the box”
model, and so the classifier was built on top of the radial basis function kernel.
Details of the Support Vector Classifier can be found in James [6] or the Scikit-learn
documentation [18].
3.4 Results
We split the results here into three subsections for clarity, first presenting and discussing
the malware data transformations with respect to the algorithms they were tested
on. We then turn to the ways that all six architectures performed on the raw data.
Finally, we discuss the information plane of our neural networks.
3.4.1 Malware Dataset Transformation
Our results for the transformed datasets, contained in Table 3-II show our test accuracy
and the mean time per batch for each neural network. The time per batch is not
available for the baseline models.
In terms of accuracy, we find that the random forest on the raw data performs best,
followed closely by the random forest on the wavelet-transformed data, and third the
random forest trained on the Fourier-transformed data. On all datasets, the random
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Data and Architecture Combination Test Accuracy Mean Step Time (µs)
Raw, Fully-Connected NN 63.40% 13
Summary, Fully-Connected NN 55.14% 13
Fourier, Fully-Connected NN 59.88% 12
Wavelet, Fully-Connected NN 61.95% 12
Raw, Convolutional NN 72.89% 54
Fourier, Convolutional NN 70.81% 56
Wavelet, Convolutional NN 70.77% 52
Raw, Random Forest 80.28% N/A
Summary, Random Forest 76.91% N/A
Fourier, Random Forest 79.63% N/A
Wavelet, Random Forest 79.80% N/A
Raw, Support Vector Classifier 65.77% N/A
Summary, Support Vector Classifier 55.28% N/A
Fourier, Support Vector Classifier 55.28% N/A
Wavelet, Support Vector Classifier 55.28% N/A
Table 3-II. Classifier accuracy on transformed datasets
forest classifier outperforms all other classifiers on that same dataset. Notably, when
we compare accuracy by model, we find that for the fully-connected neural network,
our maximum average accuracy is 63.40%, while our minimum average accuracy is
given by the summary statistics. Excluding the summary statistic data, the difference
between the highest average accuracy and lowest average accuracy for fully-connected
neural networks is 3.52%, a very small margin. Comparatively, for the convolutional
neural network, our delta is 2.12%, again - quite small. Similarly, the random forest
performs near the 80% mark universally, irrespective of representation, and performs
worst on the summary statistic dataset.
3.4.2 In-network Data Transformation
For our in-network data transformations, we consider only the raw dataset. The test
accuracy and mean time per batch for both the Fourier and Wavelet neural network
are contained in Table 3-III along with the results for the other four architectures on
which the raw data was tested.
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Architecture Test Accuracy Mean Step Time (µs)
Fully-Connected NN 63.40% 13
Convolutional NN 72.89% 54
Fourier NN 63.27% 143
Wavelet NN 74.85% 228
Random Forest 80.28% N/A
Support Vector Classifier 65.77% N/A
Table 3-III. All classifier accuracy on raw dataset only
It is worth noting that one of the primary motivations for replacing the sliding-
tile convolution method with a Fourier or Wavelet method is the performance gains
identified by others [20]. However, as we show, the Fourier and Wavelet networks are
significantly slower than their untransformed counterparts on this dataset. We con-
clude that the computational overhead of performing a transform and its corresponding
inverse transform outweighs the speed-up gained by eliminating the sliding-tile convo-
lution on smaller datasets, and the method as demonstrated in Pratt [20] should be
reserved for relatively large images, where convolution is already slow. In our case,
we see a 2.65x increase in step time between a standard convolution and the Fourier
method. Unfortunately, our activation functions do not behave nicely in the Fourier or
Wavelet domain, as these functions operate linearly with respect to the space and so an
inverse transform must be applied. The question of using a novel convolution operator
and conducting the activation in that space has been addressed by Chakraborty [34]
but goes well beyond the question of simply adapting an activation function to the
Fourier or Wavelet space. The search for a spectral activation function remains an
open question.
3.4.3 Malware Dataset Information Plane Analysis
Figure 3-1 displays a zoomed-in view of the information plane for our malware dataset
and neural network. On the x axis is the mutual information I(X;M), computed
as described in Section 3.1.1. On the y axis is the mutual information I(Y ;M).
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Optimally, we want to see high values on the y axis and lower values on the x axis for
each layer - this would suggest that the learned representation in the neural network,
M , requires relatively little data about X to reliably predict Y . In this figure, each
layer is plotted independently.
Figure 3-1. Large plot for Fully-Connected Neural Network Information Plane on Raw
Data. Produced using the upper bound and binning methodology from Saxe [1] over 1000
epochs.
The cluster of data points on the lower-left hand side represent the output layer,
which gains slightly better predictive ability about the data throughout the 1000 epochs.
The shift toward the right in later epochs is suggestive of overfitting the dataset, and
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M containing more information about X. Meanwhile, the shift upward, particularly
early on, indicates the network improving the amount of mutual information between
M and Y . We define the information plane as in Tishby [15]: the plane of the mutual
information values that each layer preserves on the input and output. In the upper
right of the plot, we see what appears to be a single point - this is all three hidden
layers of the neural network, which do not see any change in mutual information. We
verified during training that the weights were changing as expected in all hidden layers,
and the network loss went down throughout training; only the mutual information did
not change. The low level of mutual information may be due to the weak correlation
relationship between X and Y , which has a bivariate correlation of 0.2629 for the raw
data.
We can see in Figure 3-2, subplots A, B, and C, that the amount of information
changes very little. There is a high level of mutual information about Y and X
captured in the hidden layers, while the output layer has almost no information about
Y and only learns less than 2 bits of information about X. Given how similar the
accuracies for the fully-connected neural network were - as can be seen in Table 3-II
and how similar subplots A, B, and C are in Figure 3-2, it’s clear that the learned
representations capture the same amount of information about the target labels. With
respect to our summary dataset information plane in subplot D, we note that the
graph looks more like a scatter plot than a line chart, seemingly because of the nature
of the transformation - that is, the entire representation of the data is changed.
As we note in our discussion of minimum necessary information in Equation 2.14,
we achieve optimality only when X uniquely determines Y , which does not appear
to be the case for our dataset. It is worth noting that all of the information planes
in Figure 3-2 aside from the summary data in subplot D do not change their mutual
information for the hidden layers and converge to the same mutual information for
the output layer - the only layer which sees a change in mutual information. It was
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Figure 3-2. Fully-Connected Neural Network Information Plane for four malware data
sets
experimentally verified that although the weights and entropies of each individual
layer did change throughout training, the mutual information for the hidden layers
remained stationary across 1000 epochs on the non-summary datasets.
The similarity of the plots in Figure 3-2, Figure 3-3, and Figure 3-4 is not a
coincidence, and the captured mutual information about the labels in the output layer
is within a fraction of a bit for all of our networks. An unexpected deviation can be
observed in Figure 3-3 subplot C, the information plane for the convolutional neural
network trained on the wavelet data. This effect happens in the convolutional layers,
and only on the wavelet-transformed data. The cause of this change is unknown,
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Figure 3-3. Information Plane for Convolutional neural network for three data sets
and is reserved for future work. Despite this difference, the dense hidden layers and
the output layer converge to the same points in the information plane as the other
networks and datasets.
In Figure 3-4, we observe that the process of putting our data through the Fourier
transform or Wavelet transform and the corresponding inverse transform, seems to
preserve both mutual information and our accuracy. Both subplots A and B mimic
the information plane of the fully-connected neural networks and have nearly the same
information plane graph as the convolutional neural network as seen in Figure 3-3,
Subplots A and B.
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Figure 3-4. Information Plane for Fourier and Wavelet neural networks for raw data
Some of the difference between the initial mutual information states for network
and dataset combinations can be explained by the stochasticity in neural networks -
that is, the weights of the network are initialized randomly, and samples are chosen at
random. As a result, it is crucial to look at how the networks converge, and after 1000
epochs, the key factor between networks appears to be architecture - that is, whether
the network is feedforward or convolutional - rather than the representation of the
data itself. Due to the remarkable similarity of the information plane, we conclude
that the representations learned by the neural network are related more to latent
structure in the data than to the specific values of the input data.
Further, for all of our neural networks, our information plane is quite similar, and
converges to exactly the same value for mutual information in the densely connected
hidden layers. The exception is the summary dataset, which is the only dataset whose
representation is not the result of a homeomorphic transformation. We also note that
this is the dataset with the worst evaluation accuracy.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 2 - Dataset and
in-Network Transformation of
MNIST
4.1 Motivation
In order to contextualize the results of the experiments conducted on malware data, we
consider the methods presented on the well-studied MNIST Database of Handwritten
Digits [35]. MNIST is a benchmark in computer vision - since our baseline convolutional
neural network is based on LeNet [10], we have a large body of research to compare
to. Additionally, MNIST serves as an introduction to the field of computer vision for
many students and so our architectures and theories can be made more accessible in
that context. The current state of the art for MNIST achieved a 99.84 accuracy this
year [36]. The best results achieved in the original LeCun paper were 99.3% accuracy;
generally, accuracy greater than 97% is considered to be good.
4.2 Methodology
In order to maintain consistency with our other findings, our methodology is the same
as experiments in Chapter 3. We leverage the hardware described in Appendix I and
perform two sub-experiments. The goal of the first part of our experiment is to best
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fit the data while ensuring generalization, and our goal is to optimize accuracy on the
test set. The results of this experiment are contained in Table 4-I. In the second part
of our experiment, we ran the same mutual information computation as described in
Section 3.1.1, and those results are displayed in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2.
4.3 Results
In this experiment, all of our models achieve accuracy over 97% which is broadly consid-
ered to be the benchmark accuracy for “passing” MNIST. For all these combinations of
architecture and transformation, the difference between our maximum accuracy score
of 99.11% and our minimum accuracy of 97.73% is only 1.38%. Comparing the convo-
lutional models in particular, the difference between the Raw, Fourier-transformed,
and Wavelet-transformed data is only 0.01%.
Data and Architecture Test Accuracy Mean Step Time (µs)
Raw, Fully-Connected NN 97.73% 29
Fourier, Fully-Connected NN 98.12% 41
Wavelet, Fully-Connected NN 97.83% 30
Raw, Convolutional NN 99.11% 204
Fourier, Convolutional NN 99.10% 237
Wavelet, Convolutional NN 99.10% 212
Raw, Fourier NN 98.45% 959
Raw, Wavelet NN 98.89% 1068
Table 4-I. Neural Network Results
Figure 4-1 was produced using the upper bound methodology from Saxe [1]. We
see from all three subplots in Figure 4-1 that over 1000 training epochs, the mutual
information about the labels for the first and last layers of the neural net is quite
similar for our fully-connected neural networks irrespective of the initial data. We note
that in Subplot C, the wavelet data yields a much lower amount of information about
Y in the first training epoch, but quickly converges to the same point as the other
two datasets, represented in subplots A and B. As seen in both Shwartz-Ziv [25] and
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Figure 4-1. Fully-Connected Neural Network Information Plane
Saxe [1], the early training epochs cause the largest increase in mutual information
with respect to the labels, decreasing over training. We also observe a slight decrease
in the amount of mutual information with respect to the data in later training epochs
- which is expected as the learned representation becomes better able to map data
to labels. The fully connected network converges to an upper bound for the output
layer which is within half a bit across all three datasets - raw, Fourier-transformed,
and Wavelet-transformed - within the first 500 epochs and begin to reduce their
mutual information about X as the network overfits the dataset. Since we use ReLU
activation functions, we do not see a “fitting phase and compression phase” as observed
in Tishby [15], but instead a simultaneous “fitting and compression” as in Saxe.
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Figure 4-2. Convolutional Neural Network Information Plane
We observe very similar results in Figure 4-2 with the convolutional network, and
we can see that the convolutional layers, which for all 3 data representations, sits near
the point (10, 2.6) throughout training, do not budge from that point. Meanwhile,
the densely connected layers sit at the same point in the information plane as in
Figure 4-1. We can also see that the output layer on the left moves to nearly the same
point for all 3 models.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Further Work
5.1 What a Neural Network Learns
In Section 2.3, we show that that the representation learned by the neural network, Z
must constitute a minimum sufficient statistic of X in order for the network to be
predictive with respect to the information bottleneck optimality equation. Moreover,
we demonstrate that the mutual information satisfies the data processing inequality
with respect to the Markov chain Y → X → Z: I(Y ;X) ≥ I(Y ;Z). Since the
invariance of mutual information under homeomorphism allows us to affirm that any
smooth, uniquely invertible map on X does not impact the ability of a network to learn
a representation, we have demonstrated that only methods of feature extraction [8]
which change the data in ways that meaningfully change the entropy of X are useful
for altering the prediction accuracy of the network. We know from natural language
processing that some types of feature extraction which are not invertible improve
the accuracy of prediction [8], but given the results of our summary statistic data
in Section 3.4, not all feature extraction methods are equally valid. This also makes
intuitive sense from the standpoint of the data processing inequality outlined in
Section 2.3, Equation 2.8. This strengthens the theory [37] that probability mass
is concentrated in locally-connected regions approximated by small manifolds with
significantly lower dimensionality than X itself, since these submanifolds would be
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preserved under this transformation.
Based on the results of our experiments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we observe
that transformation of the dataset under homeomorphism has very little impact on
the information plane. Since the information plane is largely unchanged, and our
accuracy remains quite similar, we conjecture that a smooth, bijective map applied to
a dataset does not impact the ability of a neural network to learn a representation. A
rigorous proof of this conjecture is reserved for future work.
We used the convolution theorem to process smaller datasets than in Pratt [20]
and Fujieda [22] and found no loss of mutual information or accuracy. However, we do
not observe the speed increases in the previous work, possibly due to the disparity in
our data size - the overhead of the transform and the inverse transform is larger than
the improved speed of dot product over convolution. This suggests that leveraging
the convolution theorem to reduce computational load on large datasets may be
worthwhile since we improve the speed of computation with no loss of information
but is inefficient on smaller datasets.
5.2 Malware Data Experiments
In our malware data experiments, no neural network was able to match or surpass the
accuracy of the random forest. Additionally, the random forest is a model that is more
interpretable, and trains much more quickly - two features that are highly desirable in
information security. No optimization was done on the hyperparameters of the decision
tree, and so it is likely that a decision tree trained on raw data could achieve even
higher accuracy results than were achieved in Chapter 3. Since each observation in
our data is independent of the observation before it, the relationships are not complex
and so it is plausible that a decision tree-based model could be architecturally optimal
for our problem.
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Our summary statistic dataset provided the most data interpretability from a hu-
man standpoint, and per model, provided the worst results. This result demonstrates
that human interpretability of the data does not necessarily enhance the ability of
neural networks to learn, even in relatively low dimensional spaces. Some opportunity
exists to enhance neural network-based detection, but this would likely require sig-
nificantly larger volumes of data and more homogeneity between samples. Further
work could also be done to do manual feature extraction or additional correlation of
metadata to improve detection rates.
5.3 Further Work
Our experiments contextualize results from experiments on the EMBER dataset
performed by Anderson, Raff, and previous work done by the author of this pa-
per [27, 38, 39]. Anderson found that features extracted by experts with some light
preprocessing outperformed featureless end-to-end deep learning even in spite of the
“natural” feature extraction found in convolutional neural networks [40]. Our previous
work found that raw bytes are generally not a robust feature for malware detection,
even if the support of the convolutional filter is considered and the filter shape is
optimized for the target. Our results here suggest that there may be some relevant
change to the entropy when the executable is parsed as in Anderson’s work. This
research serves as an avenue for future work.
There are implications of taking a manifold view in the space of adversarial
examples [41] that could allow us to minimize the dimension of the manifold and the
order of the coordinate system, smoothing the loss surface, reducing the efficacy of
gradient-based attacks [42]. This application has valuable contributions to the defense
of machine learning systems, a threat that organizations are not prepared for [43].
By using the ideas of a projection onto a manifold, we can categorize networks and
datasets that might prove susceptible to adversarial examples. Additionally, since
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we seek to minimize the information in our learned representation, model inversion
attacks [44] become more challenging.
Our neural network’s poor accuracy and the success of the random forest classifier
also provide a potential avenue for further study. If our random forest classifier learns
rules that partition the dataset, rather than a function that maps inputs to labels, it
may be architecturally optimal. This would require a multi-dimensional analysis of
the data and examining in-depth the branching points of the random forest classifier.
Though this work is outside the scope of this thesis, it would provide an insight into
when and why to choose certain machine learning models given properties of the
dataset.
Finally, when plotting the information plane, the parameter that seemed to have
the greatest effect on the magnitude of the changes was the number of neurons,
especially in the case of a feed-forward neural network. We observed that using very
small numbers of neurons by modern neural network sizes: 4 to 16 neurons per layer,
for example, we saw much lower initial levels of mutual information, which would still
eventually converge to the same points. We did not explore why this is the case, and
reserve investigation of this phenomenon to future work.
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Appendix I
Hardware
All models were trained on the same hardware with the following specifications:
CPU: AMD Ryzen Threadripper 2920x 12-core 3.5 GHz
RAM: 128 GB 3200 MHz DDR4
GPU: Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti 12GB
All models for which the software was compatible with GPU were trained on GPU. Datasets
were all small enough to be held in memory after having been read from disk so disk i/o latency was
not a factor in training times.
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